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WYSCHOGROD’S HAND
SAINTS, ANIMALITY, AND THE LABOR OF LOVE
Virginia Burrus
In his lecture “Heidegger’s Hand (Geschlecht
II),” Jacques Derrida announces his topic as follows: “We are going to speak then of Heidegger.
We are also going to speak of monstrosity. We are
going to speak of the word Geschlecht.”1 The
slippage from Heidegger to monstrosity to
Geschlect—Geschlect once again, a second
time, moreover—is not merely provocative but
downright stagy. “I will not reopen today the
question of Heidegger’s ‘politics,’” Derrida asserts subsequently. “But everything I will try to
do now will maintain an indirect relation to another, perhaps less visible, dimension of the same
drama. Today, I will begin then by speaking of . . .
monstrosity. This will be another detour through
the question of man (Mensch or homo) and of the
‘we’ that gives its enigmatic content to a
Geschlecht.”2 Indeed, this question of man, of
humankind or the human race, will here animate
and focus Derrida’s close reading of two
Heideggerian texts, namely, the first lecture in
Was heisst Denken? and the lecture on the poet
Trakl in Unterwegs zur Sprache. It is in the former that the hand makes its appearance,3 marked
as distinctly and exclusively human—marked,
that is, by its capacity to point and, precisely in so
doing, to designate the “enigmatic content of a
Geschlecht.”
Derrida prepares us for this appearance of the
hand by dramatizing it in advance, calling to
mind an archive of photographs of the German
philosopher that once came into his own hands.
“The play and the theater of hands in the album
would deserve an entire seminar,” he enthuses.
“Were I not to renounce this project, I would
stress the deliberately craftsmanlike staging of
the hand play, of the monstration and demonstration that is exhibited there, whether it be a matter
of the handling of the pen, of the wielding of the

cane, which points rather than supports, or of the
water bucket near the fountain.”4 However reluctantly, Derrida has, then, renounced engagement
with Heidegger’s politics and also with his photographs, so as not to have to renounce his current
project. Yet each of these apophatic gestures is itself crucial to the framing of that project, it would
seem. Heidegger’s politics and Heidegger’s photographed hand haunt Derrida’s readings—the
latter “the only thing that overflows the frame”
on the cover of the album, as we are told. If, as
Derrida argues, the doubly monstrous figure of
the Heideggerian hand is the icon of a humanity
that refuses animality absolutely, what is the cost
of this refusal? Heidegger’s own hand in politics
hovers just outside the frame of Derrida’s query.
Derrida’s lecture, delivered in 1985 and first
published in 1987, was picked up swiftly by
Edith Wyschogrod. Her 1990 Saints and
Postmodernism devotes several pages to its engagement, in a section of a chapter entitled
“Thinking, Animality, and the Saintly Hand.”5
Here I want to trace the path of Wyschogrod’s
reading of Derrida and, through him, of
Heidegger, with regard to the hand. It will be precisely in the slippages of her reading that we shall
most easily detect Wyschogrod’s own hand at
work. That hand gives us both saints and animals
where we might not have expected to find
them—in a Levinasian ethics.6 It gives us an innovative theory of imitation and excess that bypasses nomianism while also challenging the
constraints of narrativity. Wyschogrod’s saintly
hand finally gives us more than a hand; it gives us
the embrace of arms, of a womb, indeed of a
whole body laboring in pain on behalf of so many
other bodies-in-pain.
These gifts are lavish. But certain questions
will press. Has Wyschogrod inadvertently closed
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the distance of alterity, by appealing not to a common humanity but to a shared animality that may
(or may not) add up to much the same thing? Or
does her thinking of sanctity and animality together finally allow us to engage the question of
Geschlecht, of man, of monstrosity, differently?
Near the end of this essay, I shall try to circle back
to these issues through a brief reading of a fourthcentury Christian work, Jerome’s Life of Paul. I
hope thereby also to honor Wyschogrod’s own
emphasis on hagiography as a primary site of
ethical reflection.
Consider the Hand
Wyschogrod initially invokes the figure of the
hand outside of, and slightly prior to, the context
of her explicit engagement of Derrida and
Heidegger. As in the photograph described by
Derrida, the hand overflows the frame. Or, rather,
Wyschogrod places the hand—without yet identifying it as Heidegger’s hand—in a larger frame
from the start.
Consider the hand that engages the world in a complex process of altering what it finds in accordance
with some goal, one which need not be preset but
may be modified as the hand feels its way about in
completing its task. Just as consciousness is the exerting of an effort to assume the interval, so the
hand strives to master the materials it finds. Objects can, of course, be viewed as separate from the
hand, but when they are so interpreted, they are not
oriented toward a task’s completion. Instead, they
are simply objects existing side by side with only
external spatial relationships linking them to one
another. But once hand and world are orchestrated
teleologically, coordinated into an enterprise, the
world is subjected to a system of significations im7
posed by the act of work.

Consider the hand, Wyschogrod instructs us.
And, in their way, her words are as visually evocative, and as theatrical, as Derrida’s teasing descriptions of the photographs. The hand feels its
way about in completing its task. . . . It strives to
master the materials it finds. . . . The hand that we
are urged to consider is above all a hand that
works, and that works, ultimately, by signifying.
This is terrain that Wyschogrod has already

marked as distinctly ambivalent by establishing a
dichotomy of everyday work and saintly labor
that associates the former with objectification
and commoditization, parsimony, and the suppression of alterity, the latter with creative transformation, extravagant expenditure, and an
opening onto alterity. She now asks, however,
“whether there are some characteristics of the
manual shaping of the world that have been overlooked and that would link the hand to saintly labor.” It is here that she invokes Derrida’s essay,
suggesting that it “offers strategic clues for such a
transvaluation of the function of the hand.”8
Rhetorically, her argument is at this point both
condensed and fast-paced. Following Derrida,
Wyschogrod focuses initially on Heidegger’s insistence that only humans have hands and that the
hand is “bound up with thinking.” It is worth
backtracking to the relevant passage in Heidegger, though Wyschogrod does not cite it directly
or paraphrase it in full:
We are trying to learn thinking. Perhaps thinking,
too, is just something like building a cabinet [das
Bauen an einem Schrein]. At any rate, it is a craft, a
“handicraft” [Handwerk]. . . . The hand is a peculiar thing. In the common view, the hand is part of
our bodily organism. But the hand’s essence can
never be determined, or explained, by its being an
organ which can grasp. Apes, too, have organs that
can grasp, but they do not have hands. The hand is
infinitely different from all grasping organs—
paws, claws, or fangs—different by an abyss of essence. Only a being who can speak, that is, think,
can have hands and can be handy in achieving
works of handicraft [Werken der Hand].

Heidegger elaborates further on the work proper
to the hand:
But the craft [Werk] of the hand is richer than we
commonly imagine. The hand does not only grasp
and catch, or push and pull. The hand reaches and
extends, receives and welcomes—and not just
things: the hand extends itself, and receives its own
welcome in the hands of others. The hand holds.
The hand carries. The hand designs and signs, presumably because man is a sign. Two hands fold
into one, a gesture meant to carry man into the
great oneness. The hand is all this, and this is the
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true handicraft. Everything is rooted here that is
commonly known as handicraft, and commonly
we go no further. But the hand’s gestures run everywhere through language, and in their most perfect purity precisely when man speaks by being silent. And only when man speaks, does he think—
not the other way around, as metaphysics still believes. Every motion of the hand in every one of its
works carries itself through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking. Therefore, thinking itself is man’s simplest,
and for that reason, hardest, handiwork, if it would
9
be accomplished at its proper time.

There is much to discuss here, to say the least,
and much that has been discussed. For her part,
Wyschogrod briskly makes note of Derrida’s
play on “monstration” (or “showing”) and “monstrosity” (or the “grotesque”) with reference to
Heidegger’s designation of the hand as a sign for
the signifying work that is distinctly human. She
does not, however, pause to comment directly on
either Derrida’s Wortspiel or Heidegger’s
Handwerk—the latter of which is, for Heidegger,
to be contrasted, rather than identified, with “activity (Beschäftigung) oriented by trade
(Geschäft), commerce, and the taste for profit,”
as Derrida points out10—that is, with “everyday
work” in Wyschogrod’s sense, or so one might
have thought.
Rather than following through on her promise
to uncover clues in Derrida’s reading for a
“transvaluation of the function of the hand,”
Wyschogrod pounces on a problem that Derrida
has missed: “Derrida does not refer to a difficulty
that arises in connection with Heidegger’s assertion about the necessary accord between the
craftsman and his material”11—precisely the feature that, for Heidegger, distinguishes Handwerk
from other kinds of work.12 The difficulty for
Wyschogrod is this: if a builder were truly to confirm the wood’s essence, he (and he seems the
relevant pronoun here) would leave it untouched;
handiwork is just another form of utilitarian activity, she suggests. In fact, Derrida has arguably
gestured toward just this difficulty by playfully
endowing Heidegger with not one but two hands

(while stressing Heidegger’s own preference for
“this monster, a single hand”):13 “on the one
hand, but also higher, on the side of what is best,
handiwork (Handwerk) guided by the essence of
the human dwelling, by the wood of the hut [la
hûte] rather than by the metal or glass of the city,”
writes Derrida, epitomizing Heidegger; “on the
other hand, but also lower, the activity that cuts
the hand off from the essential, useful activity,
utilitarianism guided by capital.” And (as
Heidegger acknowledges and Derrida underlines) the one hand is always in danger of being
contaminated—or cut off—by the other, the
higher by the lower, Handwerk by mere
Beschäftigung. In short: “The hand is in danger,”
Derrida observes, returning to the singular.14
Perhaps Wyschogrod seems to overlook this
passage in Derrida’s lecture because in it she
misses what she is looking for: for her Heidegger
has only one hand, only one kind of work, but it is
not the hand or the work that he claims it is.
Heidegger’s hand—the Handwerk of his
thought—uses tools (a pen, a cane, a bucket, perhaps), indeed, it is a tool, conforming the world to
its own purpose, and it does so precisely by invoking the assumption that it is inherent to humanity to be “at home in the world.” “Craft domesticates technique by subordinating the object
to what is most essential to man as one who
dwells,” Wyschogrod asserts.15 Promising to return “shortly” to the problem of the hand that
unites thinking and building “through the mediating influence of dwelling”—a point “of cardinal importance” to her analysis, as she puts it16—
she first calls us back to Derrida’s lecture.
Consider the Animal That Has No Hand
“Consider again Derrida’s discussion of the
animal in Heidegger’s thought,” Wyschogrod instructs us, “the ape that has organs for grasping
(Greiforgane) but no hand (Hand) and, as such,
lacks the capacity for thought, language, and the
bestowing of gifts.” Consider the hand . . . . Consider again . . . the animal that has Greiforgane
but no hand. . . . Er hat keine Hand. Here
Wyschogrod steers more directly into Derrida’s
argument, noting that for Heidegger “the
superordinate character of the human is estab-
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lished by excluding animality from the essence
of man.”17 Indeed, Derrida himself highlights the
larger stakes quite emphatically:
I believe, and I have often believed I must underscore this, that the manner, lateral or central, in
which a thinker or scientist speaks of so-called
animality constitutes a decisive symptom regarding the essential axiomatic of the given discourse.
No more than anyone else, classic or modern, does
Heidegger seem to me here to escape this rule
when he writes: “Apes, for example . . . have organs that can grasp, but they do not have hands.”

Derrida continues, “In its very content, this statement marks the text’s essential scene. It marks it
with a humanism that . . . inscribes—between a
human Geschlecht that one wants to withdraw
from biologistic determinations . . . and an
animality that one encloses in its organic-biological programs—not some differences but an absolute, oppositional limit.”18
Having invoked Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s exclusion of animality, Wyschogrod seems
to underline his point:
Heidegger refrains from commenting on the significance of this exclusion: animal existence characterized by sentience, brute need, and repletion;
feelings of hunger, thirst, and pain; and an impulse
to procreate—whatever the animal’s construal of
these may be. Derrida observes that Heidegger
does not think through the meaning of the hand in
connection with need because need lies outside the
19
hand’s functions of giving and welcoming.

Here is another point of slippage. Derrida does
not in fact address Heidegger’s neglect of need in
the terms that Wyschogrod suggests. Rather, he
interrogates Heidegger’s absolute opposition between (human) giving and (animal) taking,
which is also to say between thinking the (ever
withdrawing) thing and grasping the object.
“Nothing is less assured than the distinction between giving and taking,” Derrida counters. Following Heidegger’s thought through, however,
he reframes the opposition as one “between giving/taking-the-thing as such and giving/taking
without this as such, and finally without the thing
itself.”20 In other words, from Heidegger’s perspective, as Derrida represents it, what the ani-

mal lacks is the as such—the ability to relate to
the thing as “subsisting and independent object”
21
rather than as “maneuverable tool.” This is a
framing of Heidegger’s thinking to which
Derrida will return in a posthumously published
lecture: “The animal doesn’t know how to ‘let
be,’ let the thing be such as it is. It always has a relation of utility, of putting-in-perspective; it
doesn’t let the thing be what it is, appear as such
without a project guided by a narrow ‘sphere’ of
drives, of desires.” Thus far, Derrida’s revoicing
of Heidegger. He here arrives at his punchline:
“One of the questions to be raised, therefore,
would be to know whether man does that.” He
goes on to suggest an alternative “strategy” that
“would consist in pluralizing and varying the ‘as
such,’ and, instead of simply giving speech back
to the animal, or giving to the animal what the human deprives it of, as it were, in marking that the
human is, in a way, similarly “deprived,’ by
means of a privation that is not a privation, and
that there is no pure and simple ‘as such.’” The
stakes are high, he acknowledges with a flourish:
“they concern the whole framework of Heideggerian discourse.”22
I have followed Derrida outside the frame of
the essay in question in order to allow his argument to become more explicit. It is clear that in
highlighting Heidegger’s exclusion of animality
qua bodily need, Wyschogrod has strongly recast
Derrida’s critique, if not simply misrepresented
it. One can assume, then, that the point is important to her. She goes on to elaborate as follows:
The striking entailment of this position is that the
hand, bound up with the welcome for the Other and
gift-giving, is divorced from need and destitution.
Thus the gift is not, for Heidegger, grounded in
lack, need, or desire, but is the result of an overflow
of the self’s good feelings about itself. Gift-giving
is bound up with the hand that works, and that,
Heidegger declares, clears a path to genuine thinking. It is counterintuitive to divorce the hand from
gift-giving, but Heidegger’s analysis neglects what
is primordial in gift-giving. The saintly gift is a response of the saint’s total being to the sheer animal
destitution, the vulnerability, of the Other. The
hand of the saint that gives, welcomes, blesses,
heals, and redeems is, by synecdoche, a condensation of the total charismatic power of the saintly
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body.
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Here we seem to arrive at the heart of
Wyschogrod’s argument with regard to the hand,
yet it is an argument that proves curiously difficult to parse, due primarily to a persistent ambiguity regarding the relations of giving and taking.
What is the proper relation of the giving hand to
“need and destitution,” according to Wyschogrod? It is a responsive one, it seems, though this
is not altogether clear until we near the end of the
passage: the hand gives in the encounter with the
“lack, need, or desire” of another. The hand as
both giver and gift is grounded elsewhere than in
itself, then: this is what Heidegger’s analysis
misses, Wyschogrod insists. Heidegger’s working hand may give out of its own overflow, but
Wyschogrod’s laboring hand gives in response
“to the sheer animal destitution, the vulnerability,
of the Other.” Moreover, it gives out of the power
of its whole body—that is, the saint, he or she,
gives of him- or herself. But is the animal always
the Other—the Other who does not give but
takes? If so, has Wyschogrod not simply repeated
Heidegger’s exclusion of animality from the
hand—whether his working or her laboring one?
Fully bodied, the saint’s Geschlecht may now be
differentiated, but how well does that human difference hold up, over against the “absolute
oppositional limit” of the animal, which, according to Derrida, inevitably “leads back to the
homogeneous”?24
Consider the Bird That Has No Home
It becomes clear that Wyschogrod has not
simply transposed Heidegger’s particular humanism into a Levinasian key when she turns,
following more closely in Derrida’s tracks, to another Heideggerian animal, namely the
Zugvogel, or migratory bird. “Not only does
Heidegger exclude the animality of the ape from
functions derived from the hand, Derrida claims,
but Heidegger also sets men apart from another
kind of animal, migratory birds,” notes
Wyschogrod, adding an emphasis that is, again,
more hers than Derrida’s:
This exclusion returns the analysis to a point
stressed earlier, Heidegger’s inclusion of dwelling

in the human essence. . . . Animals do not dwell; to
the contrary, their taking shelter is a response to
some need. Having no history apart from species
continuity, they develop simple, unmediated relations to their environment. Without stretching the
term too much, they can be said to labor rather than
to work. I stress Heidegger’s account of dwelling
because rootedness has generally been taken for
granted as that which is distinctly human whereas
nomadic existence is considered aberrant in Western philosophical and literary tradition. On the
contrary, it is the absence of dwelling that becomes
a central feature of many hagiographic accounts.
To accept corporeal vulnerability by divesting oneself of home and history so far as possible is to
transcend the essence of man through its underside
by taking on sheer animal sentience. The forest
wanderers in Hindu and Buddhist traditions, the
desert nomads of Christianity, and the exilic motif
in the tales of Jewish sages attest the wide dispersion of the nomadic theme in accounts of saintly
25
existence.

Here Wyschogrod quite explicitly identifies the
saint—whether Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, or
Jew—as one who takes on “sheer animal sentience” and is thereby enabled “to transcend the
essence of man.”26 The saint is the other, animal.
Perhaps Wyschogrod has exchanged a hand
with which to build a dwelling or shape a world
of thought, for wings and winds on which to
“draw toward what withdraws,” thereby invoking
Heidegger’s own framing of the animal thought
while disavowing his disavowal of its animality.
What withdraws from us, draws us along by its
very withdrawal, whether or not we become aware
of it immediately, or at all. Once we are drawn into
the withdrawal, we are—only completely differently from the migratory birds—drawing toward
what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal. And
once we, being so attracted, are drawing toward
what draws us, our essential nature already bears
the stamp of “drawing toward” [auf dem Zuge zu ].
As we are drawing toward what withdraws, we
ourselves are pointers pointing toward it. We are
who we are by pointing in that direction—not like
an incidental adjunct but as follows: this “drawing
toward” is in itself an essential and therefore con-
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stant pointing toward what withdraws. To say
“drawing toward” is to say “pointing toward what
27
withdraws” [my emphasis].

Yet the withdrawal of the (“subsisting and independent”) Other whose very withdrawal draws
us is not Wyschogrod’s focus. Her saintly nomads, to the extent that they have become animals in their corporeal vulnerability, do not seem
to respond to others as such any more than they
build houses. Rather, the saint takes on need and
destitution, becomes other than herself, in a sacrificial self-giving that occurs in advance of, and
independent of, any encounter with another’s
need. The need to which she responds, simply
and without imposing herself any more than necessary, would seem to be her own, or possibly
that of her species (Geschlecht?). Thus it is that
she truly labors without working toward any
goal—not even one defined by the “sheer animal
destitution” of the Other, it would seem.
If there is contradiction here, Wyschogrod
does not acknowledge it. She subsequently
brings the chapter to a close with the following
performative summation: “I interpret animality
as bound up with the alleviation of need and as related to labor whereas I see work, although distinguishable from violence, as showing structural affinities with it.”28 Here ambiguity is
reinstated: animality is bound up with the alleviation of need, it is related to labor, but it is no more
(or less) bound up with the saint who labors than
with the other to whose need the saint responds.
Perhaps animality is precisely what binds and relates saints and all the other others. If so, how
does Wyschogrod sustain her emphasis on the
alterity of the Other? Only by loosening its absoluteness, it seems. Animality may constitute a
field of mutual vulnerability that is infinitely differentiated and differentiating, if it does not confront the limit of an opposing hand that always
gives and never begs or takes. To put it another
way, echoing Derrida, perhaps there is no pure
and simple “as such” for Wyschogrod after all;
perhaps there are no humans, only saints and
other animals.29 On the one hand, we work to
meet our needs—for shelter, for example. On the
other hand, we expose ourselves needlessly,

beyond either reason or law. But how and why do
we do this?
Consider the Lions with Feet
Ancient Christian hagiography does not offer
easy confirmation of Wyschogrod’s dictum that a
“saintly life is defined as one in which compassion for the Other, irrespective of cost to the saint,
is the primary trait.”30 Many of the subjects of hagiography expend enormous energy trying to get
away from others—a movement that typically
draws those others to them all the more powerfully. Literary saints also engage extensively in
deliberately pointless activity, which by definition benefits no one. However, an excessive,
sought-after, importuning vulnerability is indeed
pervasive in the Lives of Saints, I would suggest31—and is partly (though only partly) the effect of both withdrawal from society and the
eschewal of efficient and productive work. In the
light of Wyschogrod’s argument, it will not, then,
seem mere coincidence that saints’ lives frequently feature non-human animals in contexts
that blur the lines between saint and animal. Indeed, the recent work of scholars of ancient
Christianity here seems to converge with
Wyschogrod’s insight. As Patricia Cox Miller
suggests, when ancient writers compare saints to
both animals and angels, this works less to oppose the body to the spirit than to suggest that
flesh is itself the site of ascetic transformability
and thus of transcendence: the saint “existed with
the animals in the world like water in water, in an
intimacy so profound that the animal and angel
were one.”32
Jerome’s Life of Paul is one of the most richly
animalistic, as one well as one of the earliest, of
the ancient hagiographies.33 Its narrative swiftly
charts the path of the young Paul’s withdrawal, in
the face of persecution, to a cave in the desert—
no Handwerk necessary for the crafting of this
dwelling. “Regarding his abode as a gift from
God, he fell in love with it, and there in prayer
and solitude spent all the rest of his life,” we are
told.34 The rest of his life turns out to be of no
small duration, for when the action resumes, Paul
is 113 years old, almost a century of uneventful
living having been swallowed into narrative si-
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lence. Interrupting the silence, and opening up
time, is the torturous approach of another aging
ascetic, none other than the 90-year-old Antony.
Having received a revelation in the night that the
desert harbors a monk far better than he, Antony
sets off the next morning to find that monk—
Paul, of course—though he has no idea in what
direction he should head. He just walks. Many
hours have passed in the sun-scorched desert
when he is interrupted by an unexpected arrival.
All at once he beholds a man mixed with a horse,
called by the poets hippocentaur. At the sight of
this he protects himself by marking the sign of salvation on his forehead, and then he exclaims,
“Hello! Where in these parts is a servant of God
living?” The centaur gnashes his teeth and tries to
speak clearly, but only grinds out from a mouth
shaking with bristles some kind of barbarous
sounds rather than lucid speech. Finally he finds a
friendly mode of communication, and extending
his right hand points out the way desired. Then
with swift flight he crosses the spreading plain and
vanishes from the sight of his wondering companion. But whether the devil himself took on the
shape of this creature, thus to terrify Antony, or
whether the desert, typically capable of engendering monstrous animals [monstruosorum
animalium ferax], also gave birth [gignat] to this
35
beast [bestia], we are uncertain.

This desert hallucination of a pointing, yet
speechless, monstrosity of a man-horse might
seem more than enough for our Geschlecht-blurring purposes. And yet, there is more. No sooner
has Anthony resumed his journey than he encounters a dwarf, a homunculus, “whose nostrils
were joined together, with horns growing out of
his forehead, and with the legs and feet of a
goat.”36 Despite his fear, Antony finds himself
drawn a step closer to the uncanny creature, who
offers him the gift of some dates and identifies
himself as a “mortal being”—that is, like Antony,
an animal— who has been sent as an ambassador
for his tribe (grex);37 his kind are known by many
names, satyrs, fauns, incubi (so many figures of
desire). He is also a fellow follower of Christ, the
creature explains, and he offers prayers for Antony, causing Antony to weep with joy, “marvel-

ing all the while that he could comprehend the
dwarf’s speech.” If Antony and the homunculus
speak with the same tongue, perhaps they belong
to the same tribe. This is a nearly unthinkable
thought, and Jerome again interrupts the narrative line: the satyr is gone in a flash, disappearing
from sight as quickly as the centaur. Facing a
flickeringly specular desert that has grown “vast”
indeed, Antony once again “knows not what he
should do and in what direction he should turn.”38
A third figure appears, “a she-wolf [lupa],
panting with thirst,” who crawls toward the foot
of a mountain, where she enters a cave. Antony,
perhaps panting too, follows her, advancing “step
by step” in the darkness, “sometimes standing
still.” Hearing him, shy Paul, who waits at the
heart of the cave, shuts and bolts his door. Antony
prays for hours on end for entrance, pronouncing
himself “known” by Paul, acknowledging his unworthiness, and threatening nonetheless not to
leave until he has seen his beloved. “You who receive wild beasts [bestias], why do you turn
down a man [hominem]?” he cries, and the distinction between man and beast, already doubly
disrupted by centaur and satyr, dissolves further,
even as Antony attempts to reassert his difference—now also inscribed as a sexual difference
(for it is presumably the she-wolf whom Paul has
admitted).
Of course, Paul eventually opens his cave to
Antony, and the two “mingle in mutual embraces.” “Behold the one you have sought with so
much labor, his limbs decaying with age, his gray
hair unkempt. You see a man [homo] soon to become dust. But love conquers all,” remarks Paul.
Then, suddenly gossipy, he demands news: “Tell
me, how is the human race [humanum genus]?”
The nearly comical question calls attention to a
distinction that has become quite unstable—genus, Geschlecht, the Geschlect that is human.
What is the human race to one soon to become
dust, in a desert populated with monstrous hybrids? What is the human race to a couple of old
saints sharing a simple meal—a loaf delivered by
a bird, in fact!—in the brief interval of time that
remains before the one will die and the other will
bury him?
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When that day of joy and sorrow arrives, following another interval of grueling travel to fetch
a cloak in which to wrap Paul’s body, Antony realizes that he does not have the necessary tool for
digging a grave. He has labored for love with his
feet, wandering aimlessly in the desert until he
finds Paul, but he’s not much good at working
with his hands, it seems. Fresh grief at this lack
gives way to fear and wonder. “From out of the
deep desert came running two lions with their
manes streaming back from their shoulders. . . .
Then they began to scratch at the dirt with their
feet,” we are told, digging Paul’s grave without
shovels or hands.39 Sensing that it is what they
desire, Antony offers them his blessing. In closing his narration, Jerome asks for ours.
Consider the Saint With Hands
Reading with Wyschogrod, but also with
Derrida, I would suggest in closing that saints are
the monsters among us animals—ominous portents, oversaturated signs, abysses of meaning.
We point at them and they point us beyond ourselves. As Wyschogrod puts it, the saint’s task is
both “to construct a content, necessarily extreme
... to reach for what is inherently refractory to representation,” and “to ‘show’ unrepresentability
itself. . . . Even when saintly life is an expression
of obedience to institutional norms or revealed
laws, there can be no rules to guide that aspect of
saintly work which admits of no conceivable realization.”40 She notes also that “the beliefs and
actions of saints constitute an unmediated appeal
to the lives of their addressees without recourse
to laws, moral rules, or maxims.”41
That the lives of saints constitute an unmediated appeal suggests both a call to imitate what
cannot be imitated (thus can result in no mimesis
of sameness) and a call to respond to the extremity of the saint’s vulnerability; and I would suggest that the two calls turn out to be the same. Because the saint is radically open to the need of

others, she is endlessly vulnerable to need herself
(she will give everything, again and again); and
because she is endlessly vulnerable to need herself, she is radically open to the need of others.
The appeal of the saint is that we make ourselves
as vulnerable as she is. As Wyschogrod frames
the call in a more recent essay: “If self-giving in
acts of total self-donation are seen as the ultimate
good, am I not, in the interest of the other, obliged
to bring home to the other the necessity for her or
him to engage in the same sacrificial prodigality I
impose upon myself?”42 Yet in the vulnerability
that results from such responsive incitements to
sacrificial prodigality there is not only need but
also resourcefulness—the capacity for labor,
work that is at once uncalculating and crucially
life-sustaining, that does not take time but makes
time, that does not preserve energy but generates
it precisely by expending it.43 Wyschogrod locates animality in this conjunction of bodily vulnerability and bodily resourcefulness, not as a
lowest common denominator but as a site of radical mutual opening. Animal time is the time of
opening, of awaiting the arrival of an other. Animals do not dwell but wander; they know no
bounds; they are not a Geschlecht.
Heidegger’s hand, which does not labor but
merely thinks, is not enough for Wyschogrod.
(As Derrida also has it: “For language is like the
rest, it is not enough to speak of it.”)44 She wants
the whole hog—so to speak. And this means that
her altruism holds some surprises. It is not a hand
dispensing charity; it is more like a mother giving
birth or a lover making love, painful and joyous at
once. “The saintly desire for the Other is excessive and wild,” she proclaims.45 And for that very
reason the saint herself becomes excessively and
wildly desirable.46 She draws us, is drawing us
still, both hands extended, reaching outside the
frame of the text; and whether she is giving a gift
or beseeching our generosity is impossible to say.
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